On the air side, closures of Dubai, Doha, Abu Dhabi, and other Gulf hubs removed carriers representing roughly 13.6% of global air cargo capacity

Decision Lens

South Florida importers and logistics operators face a compounding cost shock, not a temporary spike. At peak disruption, roughly 10.7% of global container fleet capacity was directly impacted, and vessels rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope added 10 to 14 days to Asia-Europe transit times. Those extended lead times hit your inventory cycles, your cash conversion, and any supplier agreement written around predictable delivery windows. The more immediate pressure is on price: fuel surcharges, war risk premiums, and emergency carrier levies are now stacked on top of base freight rates across most major trade lanes.

90-Second Brief

Today, a sharp military escalation beginning February 28, 2026, triggered simultaneous closures of the Strait of Hormuz and suspension of Suez Canal transits, trapping 138 container ships and nearly 470,000 TEUs of capacity in the Persian Gulf at peak. Ocean carriers rerouted around Africa, airlines suspended or sharply reduced regional operations, and several carriers invoked force majeure. By early April, partial shipping transits through the Strait had resumed and major Gulf airlines had largely stabilized, but fuel prices and surcharge layers remained elevated. The disruption exposed how quickly a single chokepoint can restructure global freight economics for months.

What’s Actually Happening

The conflict triggered a cascading sequence across both ocean and air networks simultaneously — an unusual double-channel disruption that removed the redundancy shippers would normally use to shift between modes.

On the ocean side, the Strait of Hormuz closure forced carriers who had recently returned to the more efficient Suez route — including CMA CGM’s flagship FAL services and vessels within the Maersk-Hapag-Lloyd Gemini Cooperation — back to Cape of Good Hope routing. That added 10 to 14 transit days and accelerated equipment imbalances at Southeast Asian and Mediterranean transshipment hubs. Carriers applied emergency surcharges: CMA CGM and Hapag-Lloyd both announced conflict surcharges of $3,000 per FEU for Persian Gulf cargo, while MSC applied an $800 per-container surcharge and declared an “End of Voyage” for Gulf-bound shipments.

On the air side, closures of Dubai, Doha, Abu Dhabi, and other Gulf hubs removed carriers representing roughly 13.6% of global air cargo capacity. At the worst point, global air cargo capacity dropped 12% overall, and corridors through the Middle East and South Asia fell 36%. Fuel costs, already rising before the conflict, hit $195 per barrel for the week ending March 27, with projections pointing above $200 — triggering layered fuel and war surcharges across carriers globally.

Partial normalization has begun. By April 3, the CMA CGM Kribi became the third major carrier vessel to transit the Strait since the conflict started. Emirates, Etihad, and Qatar Airways had largely resumed and stabilized operations by April 2. However, a Maersk-chartered vessel was struck in the Persian Gulf on April 7, and a UN Security Council measure to restore free passage was vetoed by Russia and China the same day — confirming that recovery remains fragile.

Why It Matters for South Florida Business Owners?

South Florida’s economy runs through PortMiami and Port Everglades. If your business imports goods from Asia, sources products through Middle Eastern distribution hubs, or relies on suppliers who do, the freight cost structure you budgeted against no longer exists.

The mechanism is direct: longer ocean routes mean higher fuel consumption, which carriers pass through as Bunker Adjustment Factors and emergency surcharges, with war risk premiums added on top. If you’re importing on spot rates rather than locked contracts, you’re absorbing the full volatility. If you have contracts, your carrier may have invoked force majeure — and standard transit time guarantees may no longer apply.

For businesses in logistics, retail, construction supply, or any sector moving physical goods through air freight, the compounding of fuel surcharges, war surcharges, and ground handling fees creates a new, higher cost floor that is not yet stable. Businesses with Latin American sourcing via transpacific connections face secondary effects from equipment imbalances and port congestion at Southeast Asian transshipment hubs. Even if your direct supplier is unaffected, their inputs may be delayed — meaning lead time assumptions need to be recalibrated regardless of contract status.

The Forward View

The operational question is not whether rates will fall — some will, as partial normalization continues — but how long the new surcharge architecture stays in place. Carriers have built emergency cost-recovery mechanisms into their rate structures, and historically those mechanisms are slow to unwind even after the triggering event stabilizes.

Flexport’s launch of a Sea-Air Express product — delivering cargo from Asia to Europe in as few as 27 days at rates described as up to 41% below pure air freight — signals that logistics providers are building for a prolonged period of route disruption, not a brief interruption. That kind of modal product investment is not made for a two-week crisis.

For South Florida operators, the forward pressure centers on two variables: whether Strait of Hormuz transits fully normalize before the summer shipping peak, and whether Gulf carriers can rebuild enough capacity to absorb displaced demand. Until both resolve, the cost premium for time-sensitive or high-value cargo moving through Middle Eastern corridors will remain embedded in freight invoices.

What We’re Uncertain About?

  • Duration of Strait of Hormuz disruption: The April 7 vessel strike and the failed UN Security Council vote the same day indicate that physical security in the Strait remains unresolved. What would resolve this: confirmed, sustained carrier transits over multiple weeks without incident, and either a diplomatic agreement or visible de-escalation.

  • Carrier surcharge rollback timeline: Emergency surcharges, war risk premiums, and fuel levies were introduced at different times by different carriers with varying terms. It is not yet clear which will be withdrawn first or when. What would resolve this: individual carrier announcements tied to specific conditions, likely benchmarked against fuel price normalization and route security.

  • Secondary congestion at alternative ports: Transshipment hubs in Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and the Eastern Mediterranean absorbed diverted cargo. The degree to which congestion at those hubs cascades into further schedule delays for South Florida-bound shipments is not quantified. What would resolve this: vessel schedule reliability data from carriers operating Cape-routed services.

  • Insurance cost normalization: War risk insurance was withdrawn or sharply repriced at the onset of the conflict. Whether and when it returns to pre-conflict pricing depends on underwriter risk assessments that are not yet public.

One Question to Bring to Your Team

Which of our active supplier contracts still carry pre-conflict transit time assumptions, and what is the financial exposure if those windows slip by three to four weeks during a peak ordering period?


Sources

  • Flexport — Middle East Escalation Disrupts Global Ocean and Air Freight Networks (Link)